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THE BURGER COURT AND ECONOMIC
RIGHTS*
Lino A. Gragliat
One immediate effect of President Nixon's first appointment to the United
States Supreme Court was to transpose the names of the Chief Justice from Earl
Warren to Warren Earl. That there were other significant effects, at least in
regard to constitutional law, is less clear. Warren Earl Burger served as Chief
Justice of the United States from 1969 to 1986. The replacement of one Justice,
even a Chief Justice, by another does not of course in itself necessarily produce
a shift in Court policy. It was thought that the appointment of Warren Burger
signaled a change from the enthusiastic activism of the Warren era, but he
joined a Court that still included Justices Brennan, Douglas, Marshall and
Black, the engines of that activism.
Burger was soon to be joined, however, in 1970, by his friend and fellow
Minnesotan, Harry A. Blackmun-a man whose career has demonstrated, even
more clearly than Burger's, that if it is conservatives you are looking for, Min-
nesota is not a good place to look. In 1972, Burger was joined by two more
Nixon appointees, Justices Lewis F. Powell and William H. Rehnquist. As of
then, at least, it might be meaningful, it seems, to speak of a Burger Court, but
the Nixon appointees were of course still a minority, and they could do no
more than dissent as a block in some important early cases.'
In 1975, Gerald Ford, our only non-elected President, appointed John Paul
Stevens to replace William 0. Douglas, who had finally come, after 36 years,
as close as he could to dying in office. Gerald Ford's most memorable deed in
his long service in the House of Representatives was his attempt to impeach
Justice Douglas.2 As a mischievous fate would have it, he found himself in a
position to replace Douglas when the time came that even Douglas could hang
* Copyright © THE BURGER CouRr. A RETROSPECTIVE (Bernard Schwartz, ed. Oxford University
Press, 1998 forthcoming). This paper is a revised and expanded version of the talk, given at the Burger Court
Conference at the University of Tulsa College of Law on October 2, 1996.
t A. Dalton Cross Professor of Law, University of Texas School of Law.
1. See, e.g., Wright v. Council of City of Emporia, 407 U.S. 451 (1972).
2. See 116 CONG. REc. 11913 (1970) (statement of former Rep. Gerald Ford) ("impeachable offense is
whatever a majority of the House of Representatives considers [it] to be"); Todd D. Peterson, The Role of the
Executive Branch in the Discipline and Removal of Federal Judges, 1993 U. ILL. L. REv. 809, 849 (identify-
ing Gerald Ford's attempt to impeach Justice Douglas as an "overtl] threat to judicial independence").
1
Graglia: The Burger Court and Economic Rights
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 1997
TULSA LAW JOURNAL
on no longer. As if to ensure that his tenure in office would be of no real con-
sequence, however, President Ford replaced Justice Douglas with John Paul
Stevens, whose position on most issues proved to be not very different from
that of Douglas The only other change in the Court's membership during
Burger's tenure was the replacement of Potter Stewart with Sandra Day
O'Connor in 1981. This was also of no great consequence except that it ended
the historic practice of referring to Court members as "Mister Justice."
The most important thing, surely, to be said about the Burger Court is that
it failed almost totally to bring about the change that was expected of it. If our
purpose here is to appraise the accuracy of the subtitle of the 1983 book The
Burger Court: The Counter-Revolution that Wasn't,' I can only conclude that it
was all too accurate. Far from ending, or even curbing, the judicial imperialism
established by its predecessor, the Burger Court brought rule by judges to new
heights. It had taken President Franklin Roosevelt only a few appointments to
ensure that the Constitution would never again give the New Deal the least bit
of trouble. Federal laws were never again invalidated for lack of legislative
authority,' and property6 and contract rights7 no longer presented an obstacle
to state or federal economic regulation.
There was every reason to believe that a few appointments to the Court by
President Nixon, who ran on a platform of curbing judicial power, would be
sufficient to work a similar revolution. Many of the most dramatic Warren
Court innovations, such as Miranda v. Arizona,' after all, were by a close vote
and seemed expressions of a counterculture era that surely would quickly pass
away. Such justices as Black and Douglas, vestiges of the upheavals of the
1930s and 1940s, and Brennan and Marshall, vestiges of the moral euphoria of
the 1960s and early 1970s, could not be expected to come along again. The
Constitution, one could confidently predict, would soon cease to prohibit state
laws providing for prayer in the schools or seeking to suppress pornography;
defendant's guilt, not the manner in which evidence of guilt was obtained,
would again become the central issue in criminal trials; the Court's wildly am-
bitious move in 1968 from prohibiting racial segregation to requiring racial
integration9 would certainly come to a halt.
Amazingly, none of this was to be. Not a single one of the controversial
innovations of the Warren Court was reversed during the Burger era. On the
contrary, additional innovations, as in the creation of a constitutional right to an
3. The nomination of Robert Bork, which might have been of some consequence, was urged upon Ford
by conservatives, but an election was coming in which he feared for his chances, rightly as it turned out.
When a Republican politician is concerned about an election, it means a move to the left, but in this instance,
as almost always, it did Ford, and certainly the rest of us, no good.
4. THE BURGER COURT: THE CoUNTER-REVOLTION THAT WASN'T (V. Blasi ed. 1983).
5. Until United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995); see Lino A. Graglia, United States v. Lopez:
Judicial Review Under the Commerce Clause, 74 TEX. L. REV. 719 (1996).
6. But see text accompanying note 21.
7. But see "The Contracts Clause," infra, pp. 7-13.
8. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
9. See Green v. County Sch. Bd. of New Kent County, 391 U.S. 430 (1968).
[Vol. 33:41
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abortion'" and the requirement of busing for school racial balance," continued
to issue forth. The Warren Court had apparently so solidly established the supe-
riority of policymaking by judges on the basis of principle over policymaking
by mere politicians subject to electoral constraints, that the return of basic so-
cial policy issues to the ordinary political process could no longer be expected.
The system of government by elected representatives, largely on a state-by-state
basis, created by the Constitution had permanently evolved, it seemed, into
something like its opposite: government by majority vote of a committee of
nine lawyers, unelected and holding office for life, making policy for the nation
as a whole from Washington, D.C.
The basic defect of the Constitution's scheme of government, as most
academics and other liberal intellectuals see it, is that it leaves decision making
on basic issues of social policy in the hands of the American people. The func-
tion of constitutional law, in their view, is to remedy this defect, and the consti-
tutional law of the last four decades, at least, has performed this function. The
first thing to understand about the constitutional law that resulted is that it has
very little to do with the Constitution. 2 The notion that the Justices arrive at
their rulings of unconstitutionality by interpreting the Constitution is almost
purely fictional. This is evident enough from the fact that there is so little that
the Justices even purport to interpret. The vast majority of rulings of unconstitu-
tionality purport to be based on a single sentence in the Fourteenth Amendment
and, indeed, on four words, "due process" and "equal protection." It does not
require jurisprudential sophistication to realize that the Justices do not decide a
vast array of difficult issues of social policy by studying those words. Without
the Fourteenth Amendment, constitutional law would largely go away, and we
would have to get by as best we can with representative self-government in a
federalist system.
The next and final thing to understand about the constitutional law of the
last several decades is that it has not been random in its political impact. War-
ren Court activism served almost without exception to move policy choices to
the left. It would be only a small exaggeration to say that the A.C.L.U., the
paradigmatic constitutional litigator of our time, never lost in the Warren Court,
even though it did not always win. It either obtained from the Court a policy
choice rejected in the political process or it was left where it was to try again
on another day. For conservatives or traditionalists, on the other hand, a "victo-
ry" in the Court meant only that they would be permitted to continue, for the
present at least, to fight for their policy choice in the ordinary political process.
The left, almost by definition, is not interested in protecting-it is more
interested in undermining--economic rights. The Warren Court's hyperactivism
in creating and protecting what it saw as "civil rights" was, therefore, matched
10. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
11. See Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971).
12. See Lino A. Graglia, "Interpreting" the Constitution: Posner on Bork, 44 STAN. L. REV. 1019, 1047
(1992).
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by its total lack of interest in protecting property and contract rights. In this, as
in virtually all other aspects of constitutional law, the Burger Court made very
little difference.
CONSTITUTIONAL ECONOMIC RIGHTS
Economic Substantive Due Process
The Supreme Court once saw the protection of economic rights as its pri-
mary function. Indeed, beginning in the 1890s, it created the doctrine of "sub-
stantive due process" to authorize itself to invalidate as "unreasonable" restric-
tions on economic freedom of which it disapproved. 3 The economic substan-
tive due process, or Lochner,4 era came to a dramatic end, however, with the
Court's 1937 decision in West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish,5 upholding a state
minimum wage law-and illustrating, incidentally, that good constitutional law
can permit very bad social policy. The Warren Court certainly had no interest
in reviving economic substantive due process, and the Burger Court's interest
was no greater.
The Nixon Justices were no doubt more sympathetic, or at least less antag-
onistic, to private property interests, than, say, Black and Douglas, but they
were no more willing to revive economic substantive due process. They pur-
ported to be generally committed to a policy of judicial restraint, and found this
restraint easiest to exercise-least likely to result in criticism from colleagues or
academics-where business or property interests were involved. Far from seek-
ing to revive economic substantive due process, they were willing to put further
nails in its coffin. The Court very rarely reviewed a challenge to a business
regulation, and then only, as in New Orleans v. Dukes,6 to reverse a court of
appeals decision that upheld the claim. In Dukes, the Court not only unani-
mously upheld the regulation, but overruled Morey v. Doud,7 the one decision
since 1937 that had invalidated a business regulation. In Dukes as in Morey, the
"unreasonableness" claim was stated in equal protection rather than due process
terms, but as the Court recognized by citing substantive due process cases, that
is a distinction without a difference.
Just Compensation
The two other major sources of economic rights in the Constitution are, of
course, the Contracts Clause of Article I, Section 10 and the just compensa-
13. See, e.g., Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578, 589-593 (1897).
14. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
15. 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
16. 427 U.S. 297 (1976).
17. 354 U.S. 457 (1957).
18. Dukes, 427 U.S. at 304 (quoting Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726 (1963)).
19. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl.l: "No State shall ... pass any ... Law impairing the obligation of Con-
tracts .... "
[Vol. 33:41
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tion or Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment,.' said to be applicable to the
states, strangely enough, by reason of "incorporation" in the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Takings Clause has become a matter
of heightened interest in recent years by reason of the Supreme Court's uphold-
ing just compensation claims in no fewer than four cases.2 ' The Burger Court
upheld such claims, however, only in two cases, both of little significance.
In Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., the Court held that
a New York statute requiring landlords to permit local cable companies to at-
tach cable equipment to their buildings constituted a taking of property that
required compensation. A physical invasion was involved, even if one of no
economic consequence'5 On remand, the lower court found that a one-time
payment of one dollar, which is the payment the New York statute required,
would be adequate compensation.24 In the second case, Kaiser Aetna v. United
States,' the claimant dredged and deepened a large pond and built a channel
connecting it to the sea.' The government could not require the grant of pub-
lie access to the pond, the Court held, without exercising the power of eminent
domain and paying just compensation.
The Burger Court's two most significant Takings Clause decisions contin-
ued the Warren Court's trend of giving the clause a very limited construction.
In Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiffzl the Court upheld a statute that per-
mitted the state to condemn private property by eminent domain in order to
transfer it to other private owners, even though the Takings Clause apparently
permits property to be taken only "for public use." Reaffirming and perhaps
extending an earlier decision,s the Court held that "the 'public use' require-
ment is [] coterminous with the scope of a sovereign's police powers."29 This
amounts to saying, of course, that there is no "public use" limitation on the
eminent domain power.
The other significant Burger Court decision on the Takings Clause is Penn
Central Transportation Co. v. New York City.0 When the Penn Central
Railroad's predecessor built Grand Central terminal on Park Avenue in New
20. U.S. CONST. amend. V: "[N]or shall private property be taken for public use without just compensa-
tion."
21. See Dolan v. Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994); Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003
(1992); Nollan v. California Coastal Commission, 483 U.S. 825 (1987); First English Evangelical Lutheran
Church of Glendale v. Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304 (1987).
22. 458 U.S. 419 (1982).
23. See id. at 420.
24. See Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 446 N.E.2d 428, 429 (N.Y. 1983).
In PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980), however, it is interesting to note, the
Court found that a California statute requiring shopping mall owners to permit distribution of leaflets on their
property did not constitute a taking even though physical invasion was no less involved than in Loretto. See
William K. Jones, Confiscation: A Rationale of the Law of Takings, 24 HOFSTRA L. REv. 1, 17 (1995) ("not
every physical intrusion constitutes a taking").
25. 444 U.S. 164 (1979).
26. See id. at 167.
27. 467 U.S. 229 (1984).
28. Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954).
29. Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 240.
30. 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
1997]
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York City in 1913, it made what later proved to be the serious mistake of mak-
ing it architecturally significant and very attractive. The terminal was built with
the expectation that a tower would later be placed above it. By the time it came
to do that a half-century later, however, New York City had created a Land-
marks Preservation Commission, which prohibited building over the terminal on
the ground that it would mar the view of what had become a classic example of
French Beaux Arts architecture.3 The prohibition would cost the company
millions of dollars in annual revenue for which New York City did not offer
just compensation. 2 The Court denied the company's claim for compensation,
however, on the ground that no taking had occurred. New York City had not,
after all, occupied or claimed title to the terminal; it was able to appropriate the
property to its own use without touching it, by merely prohibiting its owner
from putting it to the owner's best use.
Perhaps the major value of a requirement of just compensation is that it
serves to ensure a measure of fiscal responsibility by government.33 The need
to pay for a benefit induces government to seek it only when its value to the
community exceeds its costs. This makes it possible, at least in theory, to pay
the losers from a move with part of the gains of the winners, leaving the losers
whole and the community better off. As New York City's Landmarks Preserva-
tion Commission did not operate under any such restraint, one may surmise that
many if not most of the restrictions it imposed could not withstand a
cost/benefit analysis and had the effect of making the city as a whole poorer.
The Commission's regulation of Penn Central was likely the paradigm of a
confiscatory, welfare-reducing restriction. It would seem, therefore, an excellent
candidate for a requirement of compensation, if there is to be any such general
requirement. The Court denied compensation, however, without stating-indeed,
acknowledging its inability to state-a general rule. 4 It explicitly denied that it
was adopting the rule that a taking cannot occur without physical possession or
occupation,35 but it is difficult to explain the result in Penn Central on any
other grounds.'
The Contracts Clause
The principal specific protection of economic rights in the original Consti-
tution was the provision prohibiting the states from enacting any "Law impair-
31. See id. at 115.
32. See id. at 119 n.20.
33. See Jones, supra note 24, at 10.
34. See Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 105.
35. See id. at 122 n.25.
36. That the Court had in effect adopted a physical possession requirement for a taking to be found was
further indicated by its decision in Keystone Bituminous Coal Assoc. v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470 (1987),
decided one year after Burger left the Court. Keystone seems indistinguishable from, and therefore virtually
overrules, Pennsylvania v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922), the only case in which the Supreme Court had up-
held a takings claim in the absence of some form of physical invasion or assertion of ownership. In a sharp
reversal of direction, however, such claims have been upheld in several recent cases. See supra note 21 & ac-
companying text.
(Vol. 33:41
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ing the Obligation of Contracts."37 The central defect, if not an inherent con-
tradiction, of democracy, as the Framers saw it, was that debtors-mainly farm-
ers in those days-would always be far more numerous than creditors. If the
people could make the laws, they surely would quickly discover that they held
it in their power to free themselves from debt by simply enacting any one of a
variety of debtor-relief measures38 This had indeed been the experience in
many states under the Articles of Confederation, and it provided an important
impetus for the constitutional convention.39 The Framers therefore inserted the
Contracts Clause in the Constitution, the only important limitation on state
power, at least in terms of litigation, in the original Constitution. The Framers
saw little need for federal protection of civil rights as we understand them-the
Constitution, after all, repeatedly recognized and protected slavery--but they
saw a clear need to protect the bankers.
The paucity of constitutional limitations on state power meant that Chief
Justice John Marshall, the Court's first hyperactivist, the right-wing William
Brennan of his day, had little to work with in order to substitute his policy pref-
erences for those of the people of the states. One of his responses to this was
his invention of the "dormant" or "negative" Commerce Clause, purporting to
find in the grant of the commerce power to Congress a grant of power to judges
to invalidate state commercial and financial regulation more or less at will.41 In
a pinch, all else failing, Marshall simply resorted to "natural law,"'42 which has
the happy facility, of course, of meaning whatever its discoverer wants it to
mean: all that is required is a willingness to assume that one has access to
sources of authority unavailable to ordinary mortals. Insofar, however, as Mar-
shall wished to appear to be enforcing something actually in the Constitution, it
had to be the Contracts Clause, which he therefore proceeded to expand and
distort beyond all recognition. He used it, for example, to prohibit Georgia from
canceling a massive corrupt land transaction43 and to prevent New Hampshire
from restructuring the governing board of a college.'
Marshall's successor, Chief Justice Taney, cut back on what Marshall had
made of the Contracts Clause,4' but it remained a major source of constitution-
37. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10.
38. See, e.g., Act of July 13, 1933, 1933 111. Laws 682 (lengthening the debt repayment time); Act of
Dec, 7, 1861, ch. 7, 1861 Tex. Gen. Laws 5, as amended by Act of Dec. 14, 1863, ch. 40, 1863 Tex. G-en.
Laws 26 (extending debt repayment until after the war); Act of Dec. 20, 1784, ch. 167, Pa. 9th Gen. Ass.
Laws 233 (allowing debtors more time to repay their debts).
39. See Robert M. Lawless, The American Response to Farm Crises: Procedural Debtor Relief, 1988 U.
ILL L. REV. 1037, 1039 (1988) ("early attempts at procedural relief worsened the post-revolutionary war
financial crisis and prompted the framers of the Constitution to include the contract clause").
40. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. IV, §2; art. 1, §1; art. I, §9.
41. See, e.g., Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheaton) 1 (1824); Wilson v. Blackbird Creek Marsh Co.,
27 U.S. (2 Peters) 105 (1829).
42. See Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 139 (1810) (holding a Georgia law in violation of "gen-
eral principles which are common to our free institutions"); see also Thomas C. Grey, Do We Have an Un-
written Constitution?, 27 STAN. L. REV. 703, 708 (1975)(asserting that in Fletcher "[clonspicuously absent is
a dissent arguing that this [general] principle is nowhere stated in the constitutional text!).
43. See Fletcher, 10 U.S. at 87.
44. Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheaton) 518 (1819).
45. See, e.g., Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge, 36 U.S. (11 Peters) 420 (1837); West River Bridge
1997]
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al litigation, often in connection with municipal financing, through the nine-
teenth and early twentieth centuries. It met a sudden and dramatic demise, how-
ever, in 1934, in the. depths of the Great Depression, in Home Building & Loan
Association v. Blaisdell.' Farmers unable to make mortgage payments were
being driven from their farms to wander homeless with their families and few
possessions in a world without jobs. Some of them, insufficiently cognizant of
the sanctity of contract rights, were proposing to shoot judges and sheriffs who
ordered or executed mortgage foreclosures. Minnesota, deciding that something
had to be done, enacted a mortgage moratorium law, precluding or delaying
foreclosures despite defaults.47 Bankers challenged the law, bringing to the
Court at last exactly the sort of debtor-relief measure the Contracts Clause was
meant to prohibit, perhaps the most clearly unconstitutional law to come to the
Court in its history.
The Blaisdell case presents a clear illustration of the fundamental problem
of constitutionalism, namely that the attempt to govern the living by the dead
hand of the past can be a very bad idea. It is simply not possible to improve on
a political arrangement in which the policy issues of today are decided by the
people of today in light of current knowledge and circumstances, and not neces-
sarily in accord with the views of people who are no longer with us. Perceiving
the obvious wisdom of this, the Court in Blaisdell upheld the Minnesota law,
although only by a five-to-four vote, thereby losing its best, if not its only,
opportunity to hold unconstitutional a law that really was. This required the
Court, however, to explicitly divorce constitutional law from the intent of the
Framers and, therefore, from the Constitution, leaving it simply a vehicle for
enactment of the policy views of the Justices.
The Court denounced as patently invalid the view that "the great clauses of
the Constitution must be confined to the interpretation which the framers, with
the conditions and outlook of their time, would have placed upon
them.... ." This, however, is not an argument for a method of interpretation
not dependent on the Framers' (and ratifiers') intent-there is no such meth-
od-but an argument against constitutionalism.49 The argument can be justified
as pro-democratic when used, as in Blaisdell, to escape or permit escape from a
constitutional restriction and thereby return a policy issue to the political pro-
cess. Unfortunately, Blaisdell's argument against original intent has since been
used, not to eliminate, but to multiply constitutional restraints and thereby justi-
fy judicial activism, the invalidation as unconstitutional policy choices that the
Constitution does not prohibit. The result of Blaisdell's explicit divorcing of
constitutional law from the Constitution, therefore, has been not to enhance, but
to limit the right of self-government, not to free us from government by the
Co. v. Dix, 47 U.S. (6 Howard) 507 (1848).
46. 290 U.S. 398 (1934).
47. 1933 Minn. Laws 339.
48. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. at 443.
49. See Graglia, supra note 12, at 1020-1026.
[Vol. 33:41
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dead, but to subject us to rule by electorally unaccountable judges who are all
too much alive.
The result of Blaisdell was to remove the Contracts Clause as a significant
obstacle to state policymaking. Surely the most important, if not the only, con-
tribution by the Burger Court to the protection of constitutional economic rights
is that it partially revived the Clause by using it to invalidate state laws in two
decisions. The first, United States Trust Co. of New York v. New Jersey,50 in-
volved the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey, an agency created by
a compact between the two states to construct and operate interstate bridges,
tunnels, and other transportation facilities." The Authority raised funds for its
projects by selling bonds backed by the revenues from its profit-making facili-
ties.52 To facilitate bond sales, the states covenanted with the Authority that it
would not be required to use any part of its revenues to subsidize deficit-gener-
ating commuter rail facilities.53
Each state, however, thereafter passed a law explicitly abrogating the cove-
nant, and a bondholder sued, claiming a violation of the Contracts Clause. 4 In
a four to three decision, the Court for the first time in many decades upheld a
Contracts Clause claim. The Court did not overrule Blaisdell, of course, or
purport to restore the Contracts Clause to anything like its former full vigor. On
the contrary, the Court was explicit that states may impair the obligation of con-
tracts, despite the Clause. The impairment, however, the Court said, must be
"reasonable and necessary to serve an important public purpose."' That is, an
impairment will be permissible whenever a majority of the Justices decide, on a
purely ad hoc basis, to permit it. Getting the matter exactly backwards, the
Court stated that the Contracts Clause is particularly restrictive when it is a
state's own contracts that are involved. 7
Justice Brennan, joined by Justices White and Marshall, issued a long and
bitter dissent, outraged that the Court should deviate from its mission of ad-
vancing liberal causes in order to protect an economic right5 8 Under the func-
tional judicial review he favored, one asks not whether a challenged policy
choice is disallowed by the Constitution-it almost never is-but whether it
involves an issue which the judge feels should be taken from the political pro-
cess in order to impose a resolution more to the left. Unsurprisingly, Brennan
concluded that the "financial welfare" of bondholders was "being adequately
policed by the political process[]" and therefore not in need of judicial protec-
tion.59 The significance of United States Trust is not that the Court laid down
50. 431 U.S. 1 (1977).
51. See id. at 4.
52. See id. at 4-5.
53. See id.
54. See id. at 3.
55. See id. at 16.
56. United States Trust, 431 U.S. at 25.
57. See id. at 16.
58. See id. at 33 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
59. Id. at 61.
1997]
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a new rule of law-it did not lay down any rule-but simply that it relied on
the Contracts Clause to invalidate a state law, apparently restoring it to some,
even if an unpredictable, constitutional role.
The following year, in Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus,W a second
state law fell to a Contracts Clause challenge, this time by a five to three vote
and in a case involving only a private contract." Justice Blackmun, the author
of the Court's opinion in United States Trust, did not participate. A Minnesota
statute operated to increase the rights of employees under a private employer's
pension plan, subjecting the employer to greater liability.62 The Court again
held that states may impair the obligation of contracts, despite the Constitution,
but "[t]he severity of the impairment measures the height of the hurdle the state
legislation must clear." 3 Here, the law was found not to deal with a broad
problem, to operate in an area already subject to regulation, or to work only a
temporary alteration in a contractual relationship, and it applied to only a few
employers, all factors that operated against its validity. The impairment, there-
fore, was found not to be sufficiently justified." Again in dissent, Justice
Brennan, showing an attachment to the Framers' original intent that is not evi-
dent in some of his other opinions, found that no Contracts Clause claim was
even involved, because the statute was not a debtor relief measure.'5
These two decisions mark the end, however, of the surprising Contracts
Clause revival, at least as of now. In 1983, two more cases involving the
Clause came to the Court, and in each the claim was rejected. In Energy Re-
serves Group, Inc. v. Kansas Power & Light Co.,'s Kansas passed a law pro-
hibiting a natural gas company from taking advantage of a price increase that it
was entitled to under the terms of its sales contracts.67 Under United States
Trust Co. and Spannaus, the Court said, a Contracts Clause claim requires a
plaintiff to show that a law has "operated as a substantial impairment of a con-
tractual relationship." 5 Such a showing does not invalidate the law, however,
but merely requires the state to show that the law serves a significant and "le-
gitimate public purpose," imposes "reasonable conditions," and is "of a charac-
ter appropriate to the public purpose." Where the state is not itself a contract-
ing party, Justice Blackmun's opinion for a unanimous Court said, "[a]s is
customary in reviewing economic and social regulation... courts properly
defer to a legislative judgment as to the necessity and reasonableness of a par-
ticular measure."'7 This would seem to be very bad news for Contracts Clause
60. 438 U.S. 234 (1978).
61. See id. at 244 (citing United States Trust Co., 431 U.S. 1, 22 (1977)).
62. MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 181B.01-.17 (West 1993).
63. Allied, 438 U.S. at 243.
64. See id. at 251.
65. See Id. at 257.
66. 459 U.S. 400 (1983).
67. See id.
68. Allied, 438 U.S. at 244.
69. United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 22 (1977).
70. Id. at 22-23.
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claims based on private contracts, reducing them to the status of claims based
on economic substantive due process.
The Court found that in the circumstances of a price-regulated industry, the
impairment of contract obligations caused by the Kansas law was not "substan-
tial."7' The Court added gratuitously, over the protest of Justices Rehnquist
and Powell, that in any event, the law served a legitimate purpose by reasonable
means.' While the decision may not necessarily be inconsistent with United
States Trust-though it does seem inconsistent with Spannaus-it certainly
further restricts the limited revival of the Contracts Clause that decision seemed
to signal.
Finally, in 1983 in Exxon Corp. v. Eagerton.' a unanimous Court upheld
against a Contracts Clause claim an Alabama law that prohibited oil and gas
producers from passing on a tax increase to their customers, as they were per-
mitted to do under their contracts.74 The Court held, reasonably enough it
seems, that the challenged law, unlike the laws in United States Trust and
Spannaus, created a rule of general applicability; it was not specifically directed
to altering contract obligations and affected them only incidentally
In a decision handed down one year later, the Court delivered the further
discouraging news to Contracts Clause claimants that the Due Process Clause of
the Fifth Amendment does not make the Contracts Clause, unlike the Equal
Protection Clause," applicable to the federal government.' Only the due pro-
cess requirement applies to federal law, which the Court said, imposes a less
rigorous standard.78 The Supreme Court has not made any later Contracts
Clause decisions. It seems fair to conclude that the Burger Court's one innova-
tion or deviation as to constitutional economic rights is unlikely to prove of
continuing importance.
ANTITRUST
'Although the Burger Court era was rather uneventful in terms of constitu-
tional economic rights, it was little short of revolutionary in terms of economic
rights under the antitrust laws. Although antitrust is supposedly a matter of stat-
utory, not constitutional, law, the difference is not as great as might appear. The
Supreme Court once noted that the Sherman Act, the basic antitrust statute, "has
a generality and adaptability comparable to that found to be desirable in con-
stitutional provisions." '79 That is, it too, is essentially devoid of content. Both
71. See Energy Reserves Group, Inc., 459 U.S. at 401.
72. See id. at 416.
73. 462 U.S. 176 (1983).
74. See id.
75. See id. at 191.
76. See Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
77. See Pension Benefit Guar. Co. v. R.A. Gray, 467 U.S. 717 (1984).
78. See id. at 719-20.
79. Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288 U.S. 344, 360 (1933).
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antitrust and constitutional law are essentially common law subjects, created by
the Supreme Court almost entirely out of whole cloth. Antitrust decisions are
theoretically subject to congressional revision, but that rarely happens, and
constitutional law, too, it seems, is sometimes subject to change by ordinary
legislation. The 1965 Voting Rights Act,s for example, "overruled" a Supreme
Court decision upholding literacy tests,"1 and more recently, the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act," purportedly "overruled" the Court's decision that
religious practices are not generally exempt from the application of ordinary
law.83
The Warren Court
The Burger Court inherited from its predecessor a body of antitrust law
that had been inflated almost to the bursting point. The Warren Court essential-
ly took the position that it was not competent to determine the competitive
consequences of challenged business arrangements.84 One can hardly quarrel
with that premise, but it should lead, one would think, to the conclusion that
very few business arrangements can be held illegal, because not found to be
anticompetitive. In the euphoria of an era, encompassing the 1960s, however,
that believed that more law, government, and coercion was a prescription for
social progress, it led to the opposite conclusion, that nearly all challenged
business arrangements, no matter how apparently reasonable, efficient and pro-
ductive, were illegal per se, that is, illegal without inquiry into either their
anticompetitive effects or their procompetitive justifications.
By the time the Warren Court finished its work, the so-called per se of-
fenses encompassed nearly all of antitrust. They included horizontal price fixing
agreements, whether setting minimum"5 or, more questionably, maximum pric-
es;' resale price maintenance agreements, again whether setting minimum"
or, more questionably still, maximum prices;88 group boycotts or concerted
refusals to deal; 9 tie-in arrangements' and, in effect, exclusive dealing;9
and most surprisingly and questionably, all agreements between manufacturers
and dealers restricting the dealers' freedom in the distribution of the
80. See Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 445 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1971 (1994)); upheld in
Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966).
81. See Lassiter v. Northampton County Bd. of Elections, 360 U.S. 45 (1963).
82. See 42 U.S.C. 2000bb (Supp. V 1993).
83. Employment Div., Dept. of Human Resources of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990). The R.F.R.A.
was invalidated, however, in City of Boerne v. Flores, 117 S.Ct. 2157 (1997).
84. See United States v. Topco Assoc., 405 U.S. 596, 609-10 (1972). "[C]ourts are of limited utility in
examining difficult economic problems." Id. at 609 (post Warren, but reflecting Warren Court attitudes).
85. See United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 166 (1940).
86. See Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc., 340 U.S. 210 (1951).
87. See Dr. Miles Med. Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373, 374-75 (1911).
88. See Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145 (1968).
89. See Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207 (1959).
90. See International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947).
91. See Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293 (1949).
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manufacturer's goods. 2 If it is a desideratum of law that results be predictable,
antitrust law approached the ideal; the rule could not have been more simple
and clear- plaintiff always wins. As Justice Potter Stewart put it, dissenting in a
merger case, "[tihe sole consistency that I can find is that under ... [merger
law], the Government always wins. ' "
Local price-cutting by large national companies to the injury of smaller
competitors was likely to be condemned as illegal price discrimination under
the Clayton Act, as amended by the Robinson-Patman Act,94 and as an attempt
to monopolize by predatory pricing under Section 2 of the Sherman Act.' An
illegal conspiracy under Section 1 of the Sherman Act could be found on the
basis of a company's dealing with a wholly-owned corporate subsidiary, i.e., a
company could be found guilty of conspiring with itself.5 Summary judgment
for defendants was virtually eliminated as a possibility,' giving antitrust law,
with its mandatory treble damages and attorneys' fees, almost unlimited poten-
tial as a tool of extortion, a potential that was frequently realized. In sum, in-
stead of protecting and encouraging competition, antitrust law often operated to
make competition dangerous.
A New Era Begins
All of this was changed and changed drastically by the Burger Court."
After being expanded to the point of encompassing almost every business trans-
action, antitrust has now been shrunk to the point of almost disappearing. Like
labor law, antitrust is in danger of becoming-and in both cases clearly to the
common good-a subject largely of historical interest.
The dawning of a new antitrust day was indicated by the Court's 1974
decision in United States v. General Dynamics Corp.9 in which the apparently
finn rule that the government always wins in merger cases was broken. In the
past, merger cases were decided almost entirely on the basis of market shares,
with the defimition of the relevant market typically being manipulated so as to
maximize defendant's market share and, therefore, the merger's vulnerability. In
General Dynamics, however, the Court looked behind the numbers to market
and economic realities and found that the merger was not likely to have the
anticompetitive consequences the market share alone might suggest." It is
possible to distinguish General Dynamics on its facts from earlier cases, but the
vigorous dissent of Justice Douglas, joined by Justices Brennan, White and
92. See United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967).
93. United States v. Von's Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270, 301 (1966) (Stewart, J., dissenting).
94. The Clayton Act, §2(a), 38 Stat. 730 (1914), as amended by the Robinson-Patman Act, 49 Stat. 1526
(1936) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1994)).
95. See Utah Pie Co. v. Continental Banking Co., 386 U.S. 685 (1967).
96. See United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 332 U.S. 218, 221-22 (1947).
97. See Poller v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 368 U.S. 464 (1962).
98. But see Richard A. Posner, The Antitrust Decisions of the Burger Court, 47 ANITRuST L. J. 819,
819 (1978) ("the Burger Court's impact... has been relatively small").
99. 415 U.S. 486 (1974).
100. See id.
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Marshall, from the Court's rejection of market share as determinative corrobo-
rated that the law had changed direction.
With the Court's 1977 decision in Continental TV, Inc. v. GTE
Sylvania,"°' the change in direction became undeniable and almost total. Per-
haps the high point of the Warren Court's drive to expand antitrust liability was
its literally incredible-neither the lower courts nor most commentators could
bring themselves to believe it ----1967 decision in United States v. Arnold,
Schwinn & Co."'3 In a 1911 decision, Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park
& Sons Co.," the Court held, over the dissent of Justice Holmes, that the
Sherman Act applied to vertical (i.e., buyer-seller) as well as horizontal (i.e.,
competitor) agreements; and specifically, that the Act prohibited manufacturer-
dealer agreements setting a minimum dealer resale price."5 The Court mistak-
enly believed that such agreements were the result of and equivalent to a price-
fixing conspiracy among dealers. In Schwinn, the Court extended the Dr. Miles
prohibition of vertical price agreements to every type of vertical restraint on a
dealer's resale of goods." All manufacturer-dealer agreements confining deal-
ers as to location, territory, or class of customers were declared illegal per
se. 10
7
Although per se rules are supposed to make the law clear and certain, the
effect of Schwinn was to make it impossible for manufacturers to protect their
legitimate interests in the distribution of their goods without inviting treble
damage suits by disgruntled or simply litigious dealers. The Sherman Antitrust
Act, enacted to combat the Standard Oil Trust and other national monopolies,
had degenerated into a dealer protection statute. Antitrust had been reduced
from a protector of competition in national markets to a species of tort law. The
more and the worse the law, however, the better it is for lawyers, and few
things were better for antitrust lawyers than Schwinn.
The Burger era coincided with an era of growing skepticism about the
benefits of government regulation. Nobel laureate Milton Freidman and other
economists at the University of Chicago preached the gospel of free mar-
kets."'' George Stigler, another future Nobel laureate at Chicago, focused the
analysis on microeconomics or price theory, concluding that the effects of gov-
ernment regulations of business are generally counter-productive." Aaron Di-
rector, Edward Levi, and later Ronald Coase, also a Nobel laureate, brought the
new learning into the Chicago Law School, beginning the modem era of the
101. 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
102. See id. at 48 n.13.
103. 388 U.S. 365 (1967).
104. 220 U.S. 373 (1911).
105. See id. at 408-09.
106. See Schwinn, 388 U.S. at 367.
107. See id. at 367-68.
108. See, e.g., M. FREIDMAN & R. FRIEDMAN, FREE To CHOOSE: A PERSONAL STATEMENT (1980); MIL-
TON FREIDMAN, CAPrrAusM AND FREEDOM (1962).
109. See, e.g., GEORGE J. STIGLER, THE THEORY OF PRICE (4th ed. 1987); GEORGE STIGLER, PERFECT
COMPETITION, HISTORICALLY CONTEMPLATED, IN MICROECONOMICS: SELECTED READINGS 183 (Edward
Mansfield ed., 1971).
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economic analysis of law."0 Robert Bork,"' who studied at the Chicago
Law School, and Richard Posner,"' who still teaches there, applied economic
analysis to all aspects of antitrust, the most obviously economic area of law,
and found much to criticize.
Bork and Posner argued that the purpose of antitrust was, or should be,
protection of consumer interests, not the often anti-consumer interests of small
business."' They convincingly demonstrated that many, if not most, antitrust
doctrines were based on a misunderstanding of the economic and business pur-
poses and effects of various commercial practices and arrangements."' As a
result, the doctrines often served to hinder rather than advance efficiency and,
therefore, to increase costs and harm consumers. They pointed out, for example,
that because manufacturers have an interest in the efficient distribution of their
products, their efforts to limit competition among their dealers are likely to be
for efficiency purposes. Such limits are rarely, if ever, a means of gaining mo-
nopoly power, the power to raise the market price of a product by restricting its
supply. Vertical restrictions on distribution, therefore, Bork and Posner conclud-
ed, should not only not be illegal per se, but should not be illegal at all;"5
purely vertical agreements should not be a concern of antitrust.
Bork and Posner are also extremely skeptical that it is possible to achieve
monopoly power by so-called exclusionary or predatory practices or any form
of single-firm (non-collusive) conduct except by obtaining government-imposed
limitations on competition."6 In their view, therefore, antitrust should prohibit
little if anything more than pure and simple, or "naked"--i.e., not involving any
integration of operations or facilities-horizontal price-fixing agreements and
horizontal mergers that result in a very high (say, two-thirds) market share."7
In Sylvania, the Court with only Justices Brennan, White, and Marshall
dissenting, explicitly overruled Schwinn's rule of per se illegality for vertical
110. See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, The Chicago School of Antitrust Analysis, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 925
(1979).
111. See, e.g., ROBERT BOR.K, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A Poucy AT WAR WITH ITSELF (1978).
112. See, e.g., RICHARD POSNER, ANTrrRUST LAW: AN ECONOMIC PERSPECiVE (1976).
113. See, e.g., BORK, supra note 111, at 407 (asserting "that competition must be understood as the maxi-
mization of consumer welfare"); POSNER, supra note 112 at 19 (stating that "antitrust enforcement is an inap-
propriate method of trying to promote the interests of small business"); Robert H. Bork, Legislative Intent and
the Policy of the Sherman Act, 9 J.L. & ECON 7-14 (1966) (stating that Congress's motivation in enacting
antitrust regulation was to promote consumer welfare).
114. See, e.g., Robert H. Bork, Vertical Integration and the Sherman Act: The Legal History of an Eco-
nomic Misconception, 22 U. Cmr. L. REV. 157 (1954); Richard A. Posner, Antitrust Policy and the Supreme
Court: An Analysis of the Restricted Distribution, Horizontal Merger and Potential Competition Decisions, 75
COLUM. L. REv. 282 (1975).
115. See Richard A. Posner, The Next Step in the Antitrust Treatment of Restricted Distribution: Per Se
Legality, 48 U. C-. L. REv. 6 (1981) (arguing for a rule of per se legality); Richard A. Posner, The Rule of
Reason and the Economic Approach: Reflections on the Sylvania Decision, 45 U. Cm. L. REv. 1, 19 (1977)
(arguing against the "inappropriate per se rule of illegality"); Robert H. Bork, Vertical Restraints: Schwinn
Overruled, 1977 SuP. Cr. REv. 171 (1977).
116. See Bori, supra note 111, at 407 (arguing for "intervention in [government] ... regulatory processes
to extend the competitive ethic as broadly as possible").
117. See Bork, supra note 111, at 405-06 ("The law should be reformed so that it strikes at... a) The
suppression of competition by horizontal agreement... b) Horizontal mergers creating very large market
shares....).
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non-price restrictions."' The decision marked a decisive turning point in anti-
trust not only because of what it held but, even more important, because it
represented an almost complete acceptance by the Court of the Chicago School
approach to antitrust. The writings of Bork and Posner were cited and relied
upon throughout Justice Powell's opinion for the Court.' 9 The Court agreed,
most fundamentally, that antitrust cannot be "divorced from market consider-
ations, ' "' that is, that it should be used to serve only economic-protection of
consumer welfare-not social or political, ends.
No business practice or arrangement should be condemned, the Court said,
unless shown to have an adverse economic effect. Per se rules of illegality are
applicable, therefore, the Court concluded, only to practices known to have a
"pernicious effect" on competition and to be without "redeeming virtue."'
2 t
This is not typically the case, the Court found, with vertical non-price restric-
tions. Although they limit or end intrabrand competition-competition among
dealers in a particular brand of a product-they can increase interbrand compe-
tition-competition with other brands. They do this by permitting dealers to
engage in costly promotions or provide needed services without having to fear
that a competing dealer can "free ride" on their efforts by not making the ex-
penditures and thus being able to sell the product at a lower price.
It happens that except for naked agreements not to compete, very few, if
any, business practices or arrangements meet Sylvania's strict specifications for
a per se rule. If followed consistently by the Court, the result would be very
few per se rules, Plaintiffs would be required to show in every case that a chal-
lenged arrangement has a net anticompetitive effect, something they are rarely
able to do. The result would be, and to a large extent has been, very much less
antitrust liability and litigation.
The Court's statement on per se rules has not been consistently followed,
however, not even in Sylvania itself. The Court accepted the Chicago view that
as monopoly power is rarely achievable through restrictions on one's dealers,
such restrictions should be assumed to be efficiency increasing. The Court
nonetheless explicitly refused to overrule the Dr. Miles per se rule for vertical
price restraints, even though, as Bork and Posner have shown, such restraints
are quite similar in purpose and effect to vertical non-price restraints.'"
Nor did the Court hold that vertical non-price restrictions were necessarily
legal, but only that they were not illegal per se. They are therefore to be tested
by the so-called rule of reason and prohibited only if shown to be net
anticompetitive. Because of the difficulty of proving anticompetitive effects,
118. Continental T.V. Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
119. See Sylvania, 433 U.S. at 51 n.18 (citing RICHARD POSNER, ANITrRuST CASES, ECONOMIC NOTES
AND OmTER MATER.AS (1974)); id. at 56 (citing Robert H. Bork, The Rule of Reason and the Per Se Con-
cept: Price Fixing and Market Division, 75 YALE L. J. 373 (1966)); see also id. at 69 n.9 (White, J., concur-
ring) (citing Robert H. Bork, Legislative Intent and the Policy of the Sherman Act, 9 J. L. & ECON. 7 (1966)).
120. Sylvania, 433 U.S. at 54 n.21.
121. Id. at 50 (citing Northern Pacific Railway Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958)).
122. See Sylvania, 433 U.S. at 69 (White, L, concurring).
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however, the practical effect of a rule of reason approach is much the same as a
rule of per se legality. Although Sylvania did not go quite all the way with the
Chicago School, it left little doubt that the Chicago approach, highly skeptical
of most of antitrust, would receive a sympathetic hearing in cases involving
other antitrust areas.
Price-fixing Agreements
The promise of Sylvania has largely been kept."z In Broadcast Music,
Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 4 the Court refused to apply a
per se rule even to a combination of competitors-composers and other music
copyright owners-that had the effect of eliminating almost all price competi-
tion in the sale of music performance rights."z An agreement among competi-
tors is not necessarily illegal, the Court said, merely because it "literally" in-
volves price-fixing."as It is illegal only if it is shown to be "'plainly
anticompetitive' and very likely without "redeeming virtue.""'  This amounts
to saying that there is no per se rule, that no arrangement or practice (other
than a naked agreement not to compete) can be condemned as illegal without
examining its actual competitive effects and justifications.
If applied consistently, the Broadcast Music approach would be a welcome
development in antitrust. The supposed distinction between per se and rule of
reason offenses has been a source of endless confusion." It should be aban-
doned in favor of the simple rule that only naked agreements not to compete
are necessarily illegal. Antitrust is based on the assumption, whether or not cor-
rect, that competition is a good thing; arrangements that have no purpose or
effect other than to end competition are therefore necessarily prohibited. All
other arrangements, however, those that involve some integration of operations
or facilities and therefore have possible efficiency justifications, cannot be con-
demned without investigation of their competitive effects and justifications.
Consistency, however, is too much to ask of the Supreme Court. 9 In
Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Society3' in 1982, the Court condemned
as illegal per se a physician-created health care arrangement that clearly in-
volved the creation of a new product or service and had possible efficiency
justifications. The four to three decision may be seen as an aberration, however,
123. The Court did extend antitrust liability in one respect, however, by making clear that there is no
general exemption for the so-called learned professions. Antitrust applies to lawyers and engineers as well as
to industrialists. See Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975); National Soc'y of Prof'l Eng'rs v.
United States, 435 U.S. 679 (1978).
124. 441 U.S. 1 (1979).
125. See id.
126. See id. at 9.
127. Id.
128. See Philip Areeda, THE "RULE OF REASON" IN ANTrrRusT ANALYsIs: GENERAL ISSUES (Federal
Judicial Center, June 1981).
129. Indeed, consistency is impossible, Judge Frank Easterbrook, another leading Chicago school analyst
of antitrust, has shown, according to the basic premises of public choice theory. See Frank H. Easterbrook,
Forward: The Court and the Economic System, 98 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1984).
130. 457 U.S. 332 (1982).
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the result of a temporary return to power of the antitrust enthusiasts-Justices
Brennan, White, Marshall, and Stevens-made possible by the absence of a full
Court. An illegal price-fixing agreement was also found the following year in
NCAA v. Board of Regents of the University of Oklahoma,' involving the
joint sale to television notebooks of rights to broadcast college football games.
It was found, however, only after a thorough analysis of competitive harms and
justifications.
Tie-ins
In any listing of the least defensible of Warren Court antitrust decisions,
Fortner Enterprise, Inc. v. U.S. Steel Corp.'32 must rank high, carrying the
supposed per se rule against tying arrangements to a new extreme. The rule was
established by judges, at first in patent cases, on the mistaken notion that a
monopolist of one product, say a motion picture projector, could obtain an
additional monopoly, say of motion picture films, by requiring buyers of the
first (the "tying") product to also buy from the monopolist all they need of the
second (the "tied") product.' Economic analysis shows that while such an
arrangement might facilitate price discrimination-charging more to users who
have greater use for the tying product as measured by greater use of the tied-it
will not multiply or expand monopoly power.' Indeed, price discrimination
can reduce the evil of monopoly power by permitting the monopolist to in-
crease output above the level that would be most profitable if he were required
to charge all buyers a single price. Price discrimination allows a seller to charge
a low (though still profitable) price to marginal users of a product without
having to lower the price to high-demand users.
The notion that a tie-in is a device for increasing monopoly power is even
more clearly mistaken where the two products are used in fixed proportions. A
monopolist of bolts, for example, cannot gain additional monopoly profits by
requiring each bolt purchase to also purchase a nut. Bolts and nuts are merely
components of a single product, a fastening device, and no additional monopoly
profit can be made by becoming the sole supplier of more than one component
of a single product. 3
In Fortner, one division of U.S. Steel, the Homes Division, sold prefabri-
cated houses, and another division facilitated these sales by providing low-cost
financing for the houses and related development expenses. Fortner, a developer
who had negotiated a very favorable deal with U.S. Steel's struggling Homes
Division, claimed that the homes were of inferior quality. Instead of bringing a
mere breach of contract action for damages, his imaginative lawyer added an
131. 468 U.S. 85 (1984).
132. 394 U.S. 495 (1969).
133. See Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502 (1917).
134. See Ward S. Bowman, Jr., Tying Arrangements and The Leverage Problem, 67 YALE LJ. 19, 20-21
(1957).
135. See id.
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antitrust claim for treble damages and attorney's fees, claiming that U.S. Steel
had tied the sale of houses to the sale of credit.
The idea that U.S. Steel had monopoly power in credit (money) and was
using it to monopolize prefabricated housing was absurd, but the beauty of per
se rules is that they make reality irrelevant. Finding no tie, the district court
granted, 36 and the court of appeals affirmed, summary judgment for U.S.
Steel. 37 The Supreme Court, in an opinion by Justice Black, the paradigmatic
southern populist, reversed and sent the case back for further investigation of
U.S. Steel's alleged monopoly power over money.13 ' After bouncing around in
the baffled lower courts for eight years, the case returned to an embarrassed
Supreme Court in 1977. In Fortner I, the Court quickly disposed of it by find-
ing that no monopoly-expanding tying arrangement was involved because U.S.
Steel did not have monopoly power in credit, the alleged tying product. 39 It is
not illegal, the Court stated, to sell high-priced homes with the aid of low-
priced credit, which is all that was involved." This reasoning applies equally
to most or all alleged fixed-proportion ties. It is difficult to see, in any event,
how a buyer, such as Fortner-rather than a competitor of the seller--can claim
to be injured by an arrangement he voluntarily entered into, presumably because
it was the best available.
Fortner LI appeared to mean that the requirement of monopoly power in
the alleged tying product-without which, by definition, there could be no
tie-was now to be taken seriously. As a result, the per se rule as to tie-ins was
very much weakened. In the Burger Court's next and last tie-in case, Jefferson
Parish Hospital District No. 2 v. Hyde4' in 1984, four Justices voted to elimi-
nate the per se rule entirely. 2 The majority purported to retain it, but weak-
ened it still further by holding that a 30 percent share of the relevant market did
not indicate a sufficient degree of power to make the (supposed) per se rule
applicable.
Boycotts
Boycotts or concerted refusals to deal are the final practice that had tradi-
tionally been listed, along with price-fixing, horizontal market division, and tie-
ins, as illegal per se.Y In Northwest Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pacific Sta-
tionary & Printing Co.,' however, the Court in effect eliminated the per se
136. See Fortner Enter., Inc. v. United States Steel Corp., 293 F. Supp. 762 (W.D. Ky. 1966).
137. See Fortner Enter., Inc. v. United States Steel Corp., 404 F.2d 936 (6th Cir. 1968).
138. See Former Enter., 394 U.S. at 495.
139. See United States Steel Corp. v. Fortner Enter., Inc., 429 U.S. 610 (1977).
140. See id. at 610-11.
141. 466 U.S. 2 (1984).
142. See id. at 35.
143. See, e.g., Silver v. New York Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341 (1963); Radiant Burners, Inc. v. Peoples
Gas Light & Coke Co., 364 U.S. 656 (1961); Northern Pae. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958);
Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1 (1945); Fashion Originator's Guild of Am. v. F.T.C., 312 U.S.
457 (1941).
144. 472 U.S. 284 (1985).
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rule as to boycotts by holding, as it had regarding price-fixing in Broadcast
Music, that not every arrangement that could be described as a concerted refusal
to deal was necessarily illegal.45 It is not necessarily an antitrust violation, the
Court held, for a group of retailers to exclude a competitor from an efficient
joint wholesale buying arrangement. Such conduct is illegal only when "charac-
teristically likely to result in predominantly anticompetitive effects."' 4 The
result, again, would seem to be to make an investigation of the effects of and
justifications for a challenged arrangement relevant in all or nearly all cases.
Monopolization
An apparent peculiarity of antitrust, i.e., antimonopoly, law is that it does
not in fact prohibit monopolies. One reason is that some monopolies are the
result of government grants such as patents, and the government cannot usefully
prohibit with one hand what it bestows with the other. Another reason is that
some markets cannot support more than one efficient company, making monop-
oly inevitable, the "natural monopoly" situation. Finally, some monopolies may
result from exceptional competitive skill-good products sold at low pric-
es-which antitrust seeks to encourage, not condemn. The law, therefore, pro-
hibits not monopoly as such, but only monopolization, the obtaining or retain-
ing of monopoly power by objectionable conduct, 47 for example, by some
mergers.
Another peculiarity is that antitrust, at least since the breakup of the Stan-
dard Oil'" and American Tobacco 49 companies in 1911, has involved few
monopolization cases, which may indicate that the need for this body of law is
easily overstated. Most peculiar, surely, is that the most important of these few
cases have nearly all been lower court decisions.' The Supreme Court, it
seems, has largely avoided, perhaps wisely, addressing the subject. The most
famous and important of monopoly cases, virtually the bible of monopolization
law for more than four decades, was United States v. Aluminum Company of
America,' decided in 1945 by the Second Circuit in an opinion by Judge
Learned Hand, a judge who generally merited his impressive name, although
not in this case. The Second Circuit heard the case pursuant to a special act of
Congress' after Supreme Court review of the district court decision in
defendant's favor was precluded by lack of a quorum.'
145. See id. at 285.
146. Id. at 296.
147. See United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570-71 (1966) ("The offense of monopoly...
has two elements: (1) the possession of monopoly power in the relevant market and (2) the willful acquisition
or maintenance of that power as distinguished from growth or development as a consequence of a superior
product, business acumen, or historic accident .... ."). Id.
148. See Standard Oil Co. of NJ. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
149. See American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 106 (1911).
150. See, e.g., United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416 (2nd Cir. 1945); United States v.
United Shoe Mach. Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295 (D. Mass. 1953), affd per curiam, 347 U.S. 521 (1954).
151. 148 F.2d 416 (2nd Cir. 1945); See also United Shoe Mach. Corp., 110 F. Supp. at 295.
152. 15 U.S.C. § 29 (1994).
153. See Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d at 421 ("declaring that a quorum of six justices qualified to hear
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Although the Alcoa decision, as it is known, was made before the Warren
Court era, it was very much in its spirit in that its effect was to make monopo-
ly, or even a very large market share, at least in an important industry, illegal
per se. Alcoa was condemned, incredibly, not for restraining output in order to
increase market price, the basic objection to monopoly power, but for the
"exclusionary practice"'"M of expanding output in order to meet an increasing
demand, a demand it did much to stimulate. Apparently, it should have held
output down in order to let prices rise and reap monopoly profits so as to give
less efficient companies a better chance to enter the industry. If justice requires
treatment according to preexisting law, not law made up for the occasion, few
defendants have been treated more unjustly than Alcoa. The result of the deci-
sion was to make vigorous competition by large companies dangerous, ushering
in an era of "soft competition." Antitrust thus became and remained until the
time of the Burger Court a body of law that served less to protect than to deter
competition.
The Burger era saw an unusual number of monopolization cases, most
notably the government's suit against IBM, 55 followed by a dozen private
suits," but with one peculiar exception, none was decided by the Supreme
Court. Perhaps the most significant monopolization decision of the era was
Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., a 1979 decision by the Second Cir-
cuit." Although decided by the court that decided Alcoa, the tenor of the two
decisions could hardly be more different. The Alcoa decision was now de-
scribed as "cryptic" and a "litigant's wishing well" and all but explicitly over-
ruled. '5 The fact that Kodak dominated nearly all aspects of the photography
industry-film, processing, cameras---did not require it, the court said, to refrain
from vigorous competition or take steps to aid small competitors. Even monop-
olists, the court now made clear, may vigorously compete.
Plaintiff Berkey Photo filed a petition for certiorari, but the Supreme
Court, inexplicably, declined to hear the case, permitting the Second Circuit's
decision to stand. The only expression of a view from the Supreme Court was
in an opinion by Justice Rehnquist, joined by Justice Powell, dissenting from
the Court's denial of certiorari." 9 They apparently would have been even
more emphatic than the Second Circuit in insisting that antitrust favors hard
competition. They found it "little less than bizarre"" and "difficult to fath-
the case was wanting"); United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 44 F. Supp. 97 (D.N.Y. 1941).
154. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d at 423.
155. See International Bus. Machs. Corp. v. United States, 480 F.2d 293 (2nd Cir. 1973).
156. See, e.g., Transamerica Computer Co. v. International Bus. Machs. Corp., 698 F.2d 1377 (9th Cir.
1983); Memorex Corp. v. International Bus. Machs. Corp., 636 F.2d 1188 (9th Cir. 1980); California Comput-
er Prods., Inc. v. International Bus. Machs. Corp., 613 F.2d 727 (9th Cir. 1979); ILC Peripherals Leasing
Corp. v. International Bus. Machs. Corp., 458 F. Supp. 423 (N.D. Cal. 1978); Greyhound Computer Corp. v.
International Bus. Machs. Corp., 559 F.2d 488 (9th Cir. 1977); Telex Corp. v. International Bus. Machs., 423
U.S. 802 (1975) (cert. dismissed).
157. 603 F.2d 263 (2d Cir. 1979).
158. Id. at 273.
159. See Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 444 U.S. 1093, 1094 (1980).
160. Id. at 1094.
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om"'' that a claim could be based, as it was in part in this case, on a
monopolist's failure to assist its competitors.
Having declined to take a real monopolization case, the Court, in its in-
scrutable wisdom, decided five years later to take a specious one, Aspen Skiing
Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp.62 Defendant Ski Co. owned and operat-
ed skiing facilities on three mountains in Aspen, Colorado; plaintiff Highlands
owned and operated a ski facility on a fourth mountain. In the 1950s, the par-
ties had entered an agreement to sell a multi-day all-lifts ticket, whereby cus-
tomers could with one ticket ski on any of the four mountains. This arrange-
ment, obviously subject to objection on antitrust grounds as price fixing, was
challenged by the attorney general of Colorado in a suit that was settled by a
consent decree. The current case involved, however, not the creation of this
questionable arrangement, but its termination in 1977, when Highlands declined
to continue the arrangement on the terms that Ski Co. offered.
Highlands then sued Ski Co. for illegal monopolization, and obtained a
$2,500,000 jury award, automatically trebled to $7,500,000 plus attorney's
fees. Reverting to its bad old habits, the Court apparently saw the case as a
morality play involving a small company mistreated by a bully, and unanimous-
ly affirmed the judgment." 4 A company, even a monopolist, the Court agreed,
has no "general duty" to help a competitor." The Court thought it highly sig-
nificant, however, that the case involved not a refusal to help but a refusal to
continue to help." That the case was wrongly decided should be sufficiently
clear from the fact that it almost surely would have been decided differently if
Ski Co. had not entered into the arrangement with Highlands in the first place.
One may be generally skeptical of the validity of a rule that makes it illegal to
terminate what one is not legally required to begin. It did not appear that High-
lands would have been better off if Ski Co. had never entered into the arrange-
ment. It is clear, therefore, that its complaint was not that it was injured by Ski
Co., but that it ceased to be benefited.
Highlands lacked a valid monopoly claim, in any event, because Aspen
was not the relevant geographical market. Aspen is a "destination" ski resort,
competing with many other such resorts on a national and international basis.
The elimination of Highlands would not, therefore, have given Ski Co. monopo-
ly power over the price of skiing. The district court escaped this obvious and
dispositive conclusion by finding that Aspen constituted a "submarket,"'67 a
finding with no basis in economic reality. The Supreme Court escaped it by
finding that the market definition question was not presented, but that does not
161. Id.
162. 472 U.S. 585 (1985).
163. See id. at 595, 598.
164. See id. at 599.
165. Id. at 586.
166. See id. at 610.
167. See Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp. v. Aspen Skiing Co., 738 F.2d 1509, 1513 (10th Cir. 1984) (dis-
cussing the district court's use of the submarket classification).
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make the Court's finding of monopolization any less invalid. Aspen would
appear to stand for the proposition that every refusal by a dominant company to
help a competitor provides the basis for an antitrust suit unless it is justified as
efficient to the satisfaction of a judge. That is not a workable rule, however,
and probably not the rule of Aspen, which likely will be treated as sui generis,
more an atavistic foray into tort or social welfare law than an application of
antitrust law."
Attempt to Monopolize - Predatory Pricing
Section 2 of the Sherman Act prohibits attempts to monopolize as well as
monopolization. Since the attempt offense does not, like the completed offense,
require a showing that the defendant is a monopolist, it has been a much more
fertile source of litigation. The most common basis for the attempt offense is a
charge of "predatory pricing," that is, the use of excessively low prices, howev-
er defined, to drive less wealthy competitors into bankruptcy, thereby gain
monopoly power. Economic analysis indicates, however, that in general such a
tactic is not economically rational, and therefore unlikely to occur."
A competitor can drive an equally efficient competitor (one with the same
costs) into bankruptcy only by pricing below cost. This, however, involves
incurring present losses, usually at a much greater rate than the competitor,170
for future (and therefore to be discounted by the interest rate) gains. The strate-
gy can succeed only if competitors are driven out and the losses involved can
be recouped from future monopoly profits, all of which is highly speculative.
Competitors may be able to stay in the market by obtaining funds from custom-
ers-who would be harmed by monopoly-or from capital markets.' Even if
driven into bankruptcy, competitors often reenter the market after reorganiza-
tion, and with reduced fixed costs. Most important, having achieved monopoly
by bankrupting competitors, the monopolist will be able to recoup his losses
from monopoly profits only in the unlikely event that his monopoly prices do
not encourage new entry or reentry.
The conclusion that predatory pricing is irrational in principle as a monop-
olizing technique is apparently corroborated by the fact that there are few, if
any, examples of its successful use." Further, since low prices are generally
168. See Olympia Equipment Leasing Co. v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 797 F.2d 370, 375 (7th Cir.
1986) (stating that Aspen does not impose on a lawful monopolist a "general duty to help its competitors").
169. See Easterbrook, Predatory Strategies and Counterstrategies, 48 U. Cm. L. REv. 263, 281 (1981)
(asserting "that any approach to predation emphasizing below-cost pricing as a device to drive out rivals is
unproductive"); John S. McGee, Predatory Pricing Revisited, 23 J.L. & ECON. 289, 292 (1980); John S.
McGee, Predatory Price Cutting: The Standard Oil (NJ.) Case, I J.L. & EcON. 137, 141 (1958).
170. A company with a 75 percent share of the market, for example, will lose money three times as fast
as a company with a 25 percent share.
171. See, e.g., Easterbrook, supra note 169, at 269-70 ("Investors should be willing to back the intended
victim, because it would be the more profitable survivor... :).
172. See Ronald H. Koller II, The Myth of Predatory Pricing: An Empirical Study, 4 ANTrrRuST L. &
ECON. REV. 105, 112 (Summer 1971) (finding only four successful predation cases: three "to precipitate a
merger or collusion" and one "to eliminate a rival").
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beneficial to consumers and an objective of antitrust, there is an obvious danger
in making them the basis of an antitrust offense. If predatory pricing is not a
serious problem, as appears to be the case, the best policy, may be simply to
ignore it. The loss to competition involved, if any, will likely be outweighed by
the gain of removing a possible deterrent to competition. That, at least, was the
conclusion of the Chicago school.
In 1975, Professors Phillip Areeda and Donald Turner of the Harvard Law
School, authors of an extremely influential antitrust treatise,"7 published an
article recommending an approach to predatory pricing claims less absolute than
the Chicago approach, but which proved in practice to have very much the
same effect. 4 They recommended, first, that questions of defendant's alleged
intent to injure plaintiff should play no role in attempt to monopolize or mo-
nopolization cases. Showing a supposed evil intent to injure plaintiff had been
the traditional means by which failed small companies won jury sympathy
awards against larger companies. Because competition necessarily injures rivals,
however, an intent to injure cannot validly be the basis of an antitrust claim.
Predatory pricing claims should turn, instead, Areeda and Turner argued,
simply on the relationship between the alleged predatory price and defendant's
costs. A price should not be considered predatory unless it is below some mea-
sure of costs, and the proper measure is marginal cost, the additional cost of
producing the last unit. A price is profitable-that is, makes a contribution to
revenue-and economically rational, even if below full cost, as long as it ex-
ceeds marginal cost. Pricing at or above marginal cost, therefore should not be
considered predatory. Since marginal cost data are ordinarily not available,
average variable cost should be used as a proxy.
Some variant of the Areeda-Turner approach has been adopted in every
circuit.7 5 In 1986 in Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio
Corp.,76 the Supreme Court indicated its acceptance of the Areeda-Turner
view that a predatory price is a price "below some appropriate measure of
cost."'" Citing and quoting Robert Bork and other Chicago analysts, the
Court also expressly endorsed the view that predatory pricing claims should be
greeted with great skepticism. 78 Predatory pricing, it said, is "by nature spec-
ulative,"'79 "rarely tried and even more rarely successful."'' The effect of
the Areeda-Turner approach to predatory pricing, at least partly endorsed in
Matsushita, has been largely to eliminate attempt to monopolize suits based
upon predatory pricing claims. Such suits had been a major source of private
173. See PMmii AREEDA & DoNALD F. TuNER, ANITRUST LAW (1978).
174. See Phillip Areeda and Donald F. Turner, Predatory Pricing and Related Practices under Section 2
of the Sherman Act, 88 HARV. L. REv. 697 (1975).
175. See, e.g., Barry Wright Corp. v. rIT Grinnell Corp., 724 F.2d 227 (1st Cir. 1983); Williams Iglis and
Sons Baking Co. v. fiT Continental Baking Co., 526 F.2d 86 (9th Cir. 1975).
176. 475 U.S. 574 (1986).
177. Id. at 585 n.8.
178. See id. at 589.
179. Id. at 575.
180. Id. at 589.
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antitrust litigation.
Summary Judgment Made Available to Defendants
The Matsushita decision is also important in that the Court affirmed a
district court grant of summary judgment to defendants. This illustrated and
endorsed another major change in antitrust law, the availability of summary
disposal of antitrust claims. Indeed, Matsushita shows not only that summary
judgment is now available to antitrust defendants, but that it may be granted
even in the face of complicated and contested facts when economic analysis
indicates that a claim is without merit.
Resale Price Maintenance
As already noted, antitrust long ago degenerated from a means of protect-
ing a competitive national economy to a species of dealer-protection law. The
demise of Schwinn in Sylvania left resale price maintenance or vertical price-
fixing as the only per se illegal vertical arrangement. Although the Court in
Sylvania declined to overrule the Dr. Miles per se rule as to resale price mainte-
nance, it has largely achieved the same effect by making claims of illegal resale
price maintenance very hard to prove. In United States v. Colgate & Co.,",'
the Court effectively overruled Dr. Miles by holding that a manufacturer may
control his dealers' resale price by simply telling them what it should be and
that they will be cut off if they fail to comply. In that situation, the Court said,
quite illogically, the "contract, combination, or conspiracy" (or "agreement")
requirement of Section 1 of the Sherman Act is not met." The manufacturer
was said to have acted "unilaterally" even though he explicitly sought and suc-
cessfully obtained the cooperation of his dealers.
Though Colgate in effect overruled Dr. Miles, it was in turn also effective-
ly overruled, though never explicitly, by later decisions that found the agree-
ment requirement met by manufacturer conduct-the identification and termina-
tion of noncomplying dealers-that Colgate supposedly allowed." In
Monsanto Co. v. Spray Rite Service Corp.,"84 however, the Burger Court ap-
parently restored the so-called Colgate doctrine to full vigor." The fact that a
manufacturer has demonstrated "a strongly felt concern about resale prices"
does not prove, the Court said, that he had obtained illegal "agreements" from
dealers as to resale prices." And, as Colgate held, absent proof of an agree-
ment there is no liability under Dr. Miles." Minimum care by manufacturers
to avoid obtaining express statements of agreement on resale prices from deal-
181. 250 U.S. 300 (1919).
182. Id. at 307.
183. See, e.g., United States v. Parke, Davis & Co., 362 U.S. 29 (1960).
184. 465 U.S. 752 (1984).
185. See id. at 763.
186. Id.
187. See id. at 753.
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ers should be enough, it seems, to permit them to effectively control resale
prices without antitrust liability."
No Single-firm "Conspiracy"
The Burger Court eliminated another basis of antitrust liability in
Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp.,89 by holding, contrary to
indications in prior decisions, that a business firn cannot be found guilty of
conspiring with itself.'"9 Specifically, no illegal contract, combination, or con-
spiracy can be found under Section 1 of the Sherman Act on the basis of a
corporation's dealings with its incorporated wholly-owned subsidiaries. 9 '
The Robinson-Patman Act
The Robinson-Patman Act was enacted in 1936,"9 in the depths of the
Great Depression, when competition, like capitalism itself, was held in low
esteem. It prohibits certain price discriminations or differences that have or may
have anticompetitive effects. Although purportedly an antitrust statute, in prac-
tice it has had less to do with protecting competition than with protecting small
businesses from the competition of larger ones. It has therefore long been a
favorite target of antitrust skeptics."9 Wide recognition of its anticompetitive
effects led to its being very little enforced by the government during the Burger
Court era, and in the few cases brought by private parties, the Court generally
limited the reach of the act. In Gulf Oil Corp. v. Copp Paving Co., Inc.,94 the
Court held that the act did not apply to a company with wholly intrastate opera-
tions, because it extended only to activities "in" interstate commerce and not,
like the Sherman Act, also to activities that merely "affect" interstate com-
merce.
95
In J. Truett Payne Co. v. Chrysler Motors Corp.,'6 the Court made clear
that a plaintiff does not establish a Robinson-Patman claim by merely showing
that his supplier made lower price sales to his competitors. Plaintiff must also
show that defendant's conduct violated the act-i.e., was anticompetitive-and
that plaintiff was injured as a result of its anticompetitive effects. Finally, in
Falls City Industries, Inc. v. Vanco Beverage, Inc., 9' the Court read the act's
"meeting competition" defense very broadly and further indicated that the re-
quirement of showing an injury to competition, not just to the plaintiff, a show-
188. See also Business Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717 (1988).
189. 467 U.S. 752 (1984).
190. See id.
191. See id. at 767.
192. Robinson-Patman Act, 49 Stat. 1526 (1936) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 13 (1994)).
193. See, e.g., Ward S. Bowman, Restraint of Trade By the Supreme Court: The Utah Pie Case, 77 YALE
LJ. 70 (1967).
194. 419 U.S. 186 (1974).
195. See id. at 206.
196. 451 U.S. 557 (1981).
197. 460 U.S. 428 (1983).
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ing difficult to make, must be taken seriously. '91
CONCLUSION
The Burger Court had little impact on economic rights as a matter of con-
stitutional law. The most interesting development was its use of the Contracts
Clause to invalidate state laws in two cases in successive years. The limited
significance of this partial revival of the Clause is indicated by the fact that no
claim based upon it has prevailed in the nearly two decades since. In regard to
economic freedom under the antitrust laws, however, the work of the Burger
Court has been little less than revolutionary. The Court rendered major deci-
sions in almost every antitrust area, and the result almost always was to in-
crease business freedom and reduce antitrust liability. The Court took an area of
law that had become a cancerous growth on the body of American commerce
and business, restricting competition and spawning expensive and extensive
litigation, and returned it to something like its original purpose, which was to
remove, not impose, restraints on commerce and trade.
The Burger Court so thoroughly revised almost every aspect of antitrust
law as to leave relatively little for its successor to do. There have been only a
few major antitrust decisions in the past ten years, and they have mostly con-
firmed and continued the work of the Burger Court.'"
198. See id. at 451.
199. See, e.g., Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Willliamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209 (1993); Spec-
trum Sports, Inc. v. McQuillan, 506 U.S. 447 (1993). But see Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Serv.,
Inc., 504 U.S. 451 (1992).
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